While we are waiting for more complete elections results, one of the interesting aspects of the materials released by IHEC thus far concerns the impact of the open-list system on internal alliance dynamics.
One of the most heterogeneous alliances in this respect is 316, the Iraqi National Alliance (INA), the Shiite-led bloc formed in Iran last year by an alliance of ISCI, Ibrahim al-Jaafari’s wing of the Daawa and the Sadrists. A key question has been whether the open-list system would bring into the open an assumed grass-root support base for the Sadrists that was not reflected at the elite level, where ISCI was dominant.
| Babel | Original list | Partial results |
| 1 | ISCI | Badr |
| 2 | Jaafari | Sadr |
| 3 | Sadr | ISCI |
| 4 | Badr | Sadr |
| 5 | Independent | Sadr |
| Maysan | Original list | Partial results |
| 1 | Fadila | Sadr |
| 2 | Jaafari | Sadr |
| 3 | Sadr | Local ally of ISCI |
| 4 | Badr | Sadr |
| 5 | Local ally of ISCI | Fadila |
| Najaf | Original list | Partial results |
| 1 | Sadr | Badr |
| 2 | Badr | Sadr |
| 3 | Jaafari | Sadr |
| 4 | Sadr | Sadr |
| 5 | Bahr al-Ulum | Independent |
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The theoretical re-ordering of the INA list on the basis of the partial results suggests that this kind of factor may indeed exist. It is noteworthy that in this material, Sadrist representation more than doubles among the top five vote-getters in each governorate as a result of the open-list system, increasing from 4 to 9. This is at the expense of ISCI/Badr in particular, which were dominant by default in the original 316 list (even though some Badr representatives in core areas like Najaf still do well), as well as Jaafari and Fadila, who both generally perform dismally in this material. Of the three governorates covered – Najaf, Maysan (released on Friday) and Babel – only Maysan can really be described as a traditional Sadrist stronghold.
The final ranking of the candidates must also take into account women’s quotas, although it is noteworthy that the Sadrists in fact provide rare examples of women actively being promoted at the expense of male candidates from other parties. At any rate, if these patterns prevail in the final results they might have interesting implications for future coalition dynamics (including the scenario of successful elements from 316 breaking out to join new coalitions), where negotiations so far have been conducted mainly by the old, “closed-list” elites.
Iraq and Gulf Analysis 