A Disunited Iraqi Alliance Triumphs in the South

No longer Venice of the East? The secular ambience historically associated with Basra is under pressure after a second Islamist election victory in less than a year.

On 20 December, the Iraqi election commission released partial elections results based on more than 90% of the votes cast. Due to ongoing controversies about possible fraud (focused largely on the Baghdad area), the absence of data from the vote by Iraqis abroad, as well as a complicated procedure for assigning compensatory seats, these figures cannot yet form the basis for detailed prognoses on the composition of the next Iraqi parliament. But local-level predictions for the southern parts of the country can be made with some degree of confidence.

As many expected, the elections in the south were effectively reduced to a battle between two lists, the pro-Shiite, Islamist United Iraqi Alliance (UIA, list 555), and the secularist, anti-sectarian National Iraqi List (list 731). Many had prophesised that the Islamists, who won massively in the last elections nearly a year ago, would meet with more effective competition this time. But the preliminary results indicate that the Islamist victory is now in fact even more resounding. The UIA has taken around 77% of the vote in Basra, 86% in Dhi Qar (the governorate to the north of Basra along the Euphrates) and a whopping 87% in Maysan (Basra’s northern neighbour along the Tigris) – amounting to gains in the range of 5–15% on last January’s poll. Iyad Allawi’s secularists, on the other hand, have lost around 126,000 voters, or almost half of their support in Basra and Dhi Qar and three quarters of their voters in Maysan.

Some of these figures are the results of defections from one secular party to another. In particular, a contestant with special local connections, the Movement of the Revolutionaries of the Shaaban Intifada [the 1991 post–Gulf War uprising] has done well, picking up some 2% of the vote in Basra. The party has a non-religious outlook and a leadership largely from the south. But this alone cannot explain the change. Firstly, the UIA has seen its own ranks swell because more parties belonging to the radical Islamist Sadrist current chose to participate within the Alliance this time. But perhaps even more significantly, statistics suggest that the UIA may actually have won over large numbers of voters from Allawi since last January. In a pattern seen across Shiite-dominated governorates of Iraq, absolute numbers of Allawi supporters have consistently dropped although overall participation is now higher. (In governorates where Sunni majorities boycotted last January, Allawi has only managed to pick up 5 to 10% of the electorate that this time chose to participate). The very format of the electoral campaign may have stimulated this sectarian tendency: regular debate was disrupted by the drama of Saddam Husayn’s trial, before logistical issues of conveying voters safely to the polling centres took precedence and the country came to a standstill during the week before 15 December. In Basra there were allegations of police cars being employed for electioneering purposes on voting day; a testament to the influence of armed militias in the local administration. An atmosphere conducive to moderate debate of political issues it certainly was not.

In terms of parliamentary representation, the UIA looks set to walk away with 13 of 16 seats in Basra, 10 (possibly 11) of 12 in Dhi Qar, and 6 out of 7 in Maysan. Allawi’s list will probably get 2 seats in Basra and 1 in each of the two neighbouring governorates, whereas an independent Sadrist grouping (list 631) will compete fiercely with the UIA for the last seat in Dhi Qar. Finally, the Iraqi Accord Front, a mostly Sunni party with Islamist leanings, seems certain to get one seat in Basra, where the poor performance of Allawi’s allies may indicate that Sunnis who boycotted in January now have voted largely along sectarian lines. (The more secular Sunni alternative, list 667, could only muster around 1,000 voters across the three southern governorates.)

With the huge number of UIA deputies returned from the south, the focus will now inevitably shift to tensions within that heterogeneous bloc of politicians. It is often assumed that the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is the leading force within the UIA. A closer look at the likely representatives for Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar shows that while this interpretation may be true for the Baghdad leadership, it does not square with the party affiliations of UIA members in the south. Only 2 out of the 29 UIA candidates whose seats seem secure have a clear association with SCIRI, and an additional two from the institutionally independent Badr Organisation (formerly the Badr Brigade) can be considered as being close to SCIRI. That means that more than 80% of UIA deputies from the south will have other, non-SCIRI, loyalties. Of these, 7 are Sadrists loyal to the radical Islamist Muqtada al-Sadr, 6 are members of the Fadila Party (a competing Sadrist party whose spiritual guiding light is the cleric Muhammad al-Yaqubi) 5 belong to a breakaway faction of the Daawa Party, 3 are from the mother branch of that organisation (also the party of Ibrahim al-Jaafari, the current prime minister), and then there are 4 Islamist independents.

These patterns will have an impact on the struggle over southern regionalism which has simmered in the background of Islamist–secularist tensions in Basra and its environs over the past year and a half – and which will continue over the coming year as the constitution and other relevant legislation develop further. Within the UIA, SCIRI’s Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim has taken the lead in calling for a single Shiite federal entity that would comprise all the land from Basra north to Baghdad. Southerners, on the other hand, are not so keen to merge their oil-rich territory with co-religionists further north and have established an alternative of their own: a smaller federal entity covering the triangle of Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar. Crucially, at least 3 of the re-elected UIA deputies already have a record of creating internal dissension within the Alliance because of their particularist demands for the deep south vis-à-vis the northern parts of the Shiite heartland. They are now being joined by Fadila representatives who have propagated the idea of isolating the “lesser southern region” during their past year in office in local government in Basra, thus effectively setting the stage for an internal UIA showdown over competing visions of federalism. (Among the non-UIA deputies, Iyad Jamal al-Din of Dhi Qar has indicated scepticism towards any federal project framed in sectarian terms, whereas Wail Abd al-Latif is a leading spokesperson for a smaller federal entity based on Basra.)

This southern battle over federalism has larger, national extensions that could influence power struggles in Baghdad. Importantly, the phenomenon of SCIRI hegemony within the UIA being challenged by non-SCIRI numerical superiority (in terms of new deputies) can be seen in most other governorates with the exception of Baghdad – and so Hakim and his plans for sectarian federalism may enjoy less support than is commonly thought. In addition to “southern regionalism” defectors, there are Sadrists from central parts of Iraq who are scornful of ideas of federalism altogether, and independents who are also more comfortable with the traditional idea of Iraqi nationalism defined in non-sectarian terms. Even nominal supporters of federalism like Ibrahim al-Jaafari and his Daawa Party have at times hesitated in expressing active support for the concept, and have certainly signalled distaste for the sectarian specimens floated so enthusiastically by SCIRI. On top of this there is the possibility for certain adjustments to the overall distribution of seats to secularists and Islamists if complaints about election irregularities are proven valid.

All this means that despite the indications of an overwhelming UIA election victory in the south, the tripartite model of an ethnically divided Iraq federation may still get competition from older federal designs. These include the non-sectarian “administrative” federation of 5–7 medium-sized entities (with which the small-sized 3-governorate southern region plan would harmonise) as well as the long-established scheme for a bi-national Arab–Kurdish union. The election results also have implications for Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and SCIRI: they may yet find themselves facing some quite unexpected obstacles in their struggle for supremacy over the Islamist political scene among Iraq’s Shiites.

For more on Basra politics, history and the question of regionalism, see Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq.

Towards Sectarian Separatism in Iraq?

Kazimayn: the centre of Iraq – or the northern edge of a separate Shiite state?

Photo from the late British mandate period

Threats to Iraq’s territorial integrity are as old as the state itself. Kurdish demands for autonomy go back almost a century. Secular Basra leaders challenged the monarchy during the 1920s through a bid for a cosmopolitan city-state republic. There were even plans for a Christian enclave in northern Iraq in the interwar period.

Missing from this list is a scheme for a sectarian Shiite breakaway state. Even though outsiders frequently dreamt of this kind of scenario, the Iraqi Shiites themselves, throughout the twentieth century, appeared disinterested.

With one exception, that is. It occurred in 1927. After a savage clash between worshippers and Iraqi soldiers at Kazimayn, Shiite politicians whipped up a surge of sectarian discontent. At secret meetings, whispers of a Shiite state stretching from Baghdad to the Gulf were heard. But in the end, the attempt at separation proved abortive. The leading Shiite clergy rebuked the hot-headed radicals. One year later, the whole episode was forgotten.

The movers behind the Shiite separatist scheme were a diverse coalition. Some were disgruntled tribal leaders. Some were impoverished lower-rank clerics. The principal figure was Amin al-Charchafchi, a layman from a Baghdad merchant family, with strong links to the ulama. He may not have been the separatist architect, but his ability to gain access to the top clerics was all-important. At one point, he was close to securing their support.

Is the Charchafchi phenomenon present in Iraqi politics in 2005?

The most obvious parallel is the ongoing campaign for a single Shiite federal entity from Karbala to Basra. Launched last summer, this project uses sectarian identity to push for the unification of all provinces south of Baghdad. It has largely supplanted earlier Shiite calls for a federal Iraq with smaller, non-sectarian units. Ironically, it seems as if the long-suffering Shiites are succumbing to sectarianism just as their prospects for securing a fair share of government in a democratic Iraq look brighter than ever.

The similarities to 1927 are numerous. Also today’s movement is headed by professional politicians, not by the upper ranks of the clergy. Just like Charchafchi in 1927, these leaders have immense organisational skills. And like him they have no scruples about using sectarianism to boost their influence. With determination they approach the leading ayatollahs to elicit some sort of approval for their projects – and any signs of approval, however hesitant, are in turn employed to convince electors that they have a religious duty to give their support. The continuing terror attacks and anti-Shiite propaganda by Sunni Islamists can only fuel tensions; this echoes the harsh strictures on Shiite heritage by Sunni intellectuals seen in 1927.

The pro-federal Shiite politicians do not themselves promote separatism. Their own personal motives may be perfectly all-Iraqi. It is those on the fringes that challenge Iraq’s territorial integrity. It is they who write on the internet about a single Shiite state from Samarra to Basra. It is they who see the pro-Shiite but technically multi-sectarian election ticket of the United Iraqi Alliance as essentially a “United Shiite Alliance”. And it is they who are inclined to find inspiration in pamphlet literature where schemes for a “Shiite federalism” that would combine both Iran and Iraq are outlined.

The politicians’ role is to build bridges between the higher clergy and grassroots radicals. In this they are astonishingly successful. Every single public statement by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani shows that the he is deeply concerned about the territorial integrity of Iraq and the dangers of sectarian warfare. And yet Shiite professional politicians somehow manage to maintain cordial relations with Sistani while at the same time pursuing policies that directly – if unintentionally – threaten the very unity so dear to Iraq’s leading cleric. The most recent example is the last-minute green light from Najaf for a “yes” vote to the new Iraqi constitution – a document devoid of real checks and balances against the forces of fragmentation. This sort of leeway is what Amin al-Charchafchi failed to achieve when he approached the ulama in 1927.

The upcoming elections may prove decisive. Sectarianist factions among the Shiite Islamists persuaded the United States to accord them privileged status during the exile opposition meetings. They tenaciously held on to this position after the war, and translated it into electoral success last January by joining the “Sistani list” – so named after its assumed but taciturn sponsor. Today, they are again part of a wider Shiite coalition that frequently alleges it enjoys the top clergy’s exclusive endorsement (but has yet to produce a fatwa or other unequivocal, signed and sealed statement to that effect). Will Iraqi electors once more allow these politicians a monopoly on expounding Sistani’s reticent communications? Will those agitators themselves realise that their present course poses risks to the proud anti-sectarian tradition of Iraq’s Shiites? Such issues could determine whether Shiite separatism again gets relegated to parenthesis status in Iraqi history – or is transformed into a major theme.

(This comment article is based on the recently published book  Basra, the Failed Gulf State: Separatism and Nationalism in Southern Iraq by Reidar Visser.)
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Norway’s Oil Industry and the Partitioning of Iraq

On 29 November 2005, the tiny Norwegian oil company DNO announced the start-up of drilling activities near Zakho in northern Iraq, under a deal signed with Kurdish regional authorities in the summer of 2004. Helge Eide of DNO has repeatedly told the media that he considers the arrangements to be in accordance with the Iraqi constitution.

The legal basis of this interpretation is in itself problematic. In the first place, DNO entered its contract with Kurdish authorities back in 2004, at a time when no Iraqi constitution was effective. The sole legal framework at that point was the Transitional Administrative Law – a document that enjoyed scant legitimacy among massive sections of the Iraqi people, and that failed to address exhaustively the question of management of oil and gas resources.

By the same token, the new Iraqi constitution, adopted in October this year, provides no unequivocal answers as to how proceeds from the energy sector are to be distributed between the centre and the regions. Only vague and unspecified mechanisms about “cooperation” and distribution in “a just manner” are mentioned, and there is a stated intention to employ oil revenues to rectify patterns of regional under-development created by the former regime.

In this legal haze, DNO has tried to create the impression of a loophole, in that a constitutional distinction is made – at least implicitly – between “existing” oil fields and “future” ones as far as the “administration” of oil production is concerned. This interpretation is inspired by the fact that residual powers rest with the regions under the constitution, and that only “existing” fields are explicitly mentioned in the first paragraph of its article 109. But it is hard to see how any oil field, whether “existing” or “future” could be exempt from the subsequent paragraph of the same article: “The federal and the producing regional and governorate authorities shall jointly [italics added, ma‘an in the Arabic] devise the necessary strategic policies for the development [italics added] of the oil and gas wealth in a way that achieves the highest possible benefit for the Iraqi people…” Additionally, the question of resource ownership remains unresolved altogether. The studiously ambiguous article 108 simply reads, “oil and gas are the property of the entire Iraqi population, in all the regions and governorates”.

A third legal problem is the status of today’s Iraqi constitution, which more than anything has the appearance of “work in progress”. In an attempt at mollifying critics of the document, Iraqi legislators last October adopted a package of last-minute amendments and additional clauses to the constitution. Crucially, these clauses include provisions for a parliamentary committee to reassess the current charter early next year. The recommendations of the committee are in turn to be presented to parliament in a single batch and will require only an absolute majority (instead of the standard two thirds majority for such changes) before they are put to another referendum.

This point leads on to more fundamental ethical and normative questions concerning DNO’s actions in Iraq. It would be totally erroneous to consider Iraq’s transitional and constitutional processes as closed chapters. The clause that opens for a one-off constitutional amendment package (with a lower than usual threshold for affecting change) was a deliberate effort to reach out to radical Iraqi groups that sympathise with the armed anti-occupation resistance. Instilling moderation among these groups will require incentives that can render participation within the system a meaningful alternative. The vision of an Iraq whose oil resources are shared by the entire population, the inhabitants of the oil-deficient western regions included, is central to any such effort at rapprochement.

Should these attempts at integration get derailed, more radical groups are certain to emerge from the sidelines. Among the Sunni Arabs, support for the armed resistance will grow stronger. Among the Kurds, powerful voices are already calling for Kurdish independence. And now even some Shiites have begun advocating territorial consolidation in a unified Shiite entity – an entirely new trend among a community traditionally renowned for its commitment to Iraqi unity and to multi-ethnic coexistence. This latter development is a turn of events that transforms abstract scenarios of territorial fragmentation and partition into a very real and acute challenge to Iraq’s political stability.

Into this arena, enter Norway’s DNO. Because of DNO’s actions, Kurdish politicians will feel encouraged in their ongoing efforts to secure bilateral deals with foreign investors – a strategy they have been pursuing ever since 2003. Pro-regional forces around southern Basra may show a greater appetite for such arrangements as well, thus underlining the atmosphere of an ongoing process of partition. Supporters of Iraqi nationalism will in turn react negatively. There will be claims that the proceedings of the Kurds and DNO testify to the growing impotence of Baghdad, and that developments show how the very idea of an Iraqi national community is on the wane. Comments along these lines, directed specifically at DNO’s activities in Iraq, are already to be found in Iraqi discussion groups on the internet.

Such developments will be unhelpful to the upcoming re-negotiation of the Iraqi constitution – a process that will require moderation on all sides, not brinkmanship and maximalist demands. A pivotal problem is that DNO’s activities play right into the hands of those seeking to discredit federalism as a viable option for the new Iraq. Clichés like “federalism means division” and “federalism is a plot directed by the US, Israel and international capitalism” will get nourishment and may once again come to the fore.

Why should a Norwegian company have taken the lead among those intervening in an already complex Iraqi political process? Perhaps it may be a simple matter of unawareness as to the potential controversies over concepts like “regionalism” – in European political discourse generally considered a positive term, but in Iraq still a vexed issue. Perhaps the reason may be that Norway itself lacks a colonialist past – experiences that have taught other Europeans about the political sensitivities of ethnic and religious tensions. Maybe it is because Norwegians tend to translate their sympathies for the sufferings of the Kurds into rather uncritical embraces of the most nationalist wings of the Kurdish political movements. Whatever the reason, it surely is a great disappointment that Norway’s first venture off the beaten track in Iraq has been undertaken in a manner that will do nothing but muddle the complicated ongoing process of transition.

As a minimum of respect for Iraq’s efforts to build a new democracy, foreign companies involved in the country should postpone any bilateral oil and gas deals with regional authorities until the constitutional process has been concluded, with a more precise definition of the relationship between Baghdad and the regions. This may well lessen profits in the short run. But to those with longer-term interests in the Middle East, such a course of action would mean avoiding ethical pitfalls and stigmas far more damaging to a company’s credibility in the region.

Postscript note added 11 January 2006: DNO struck oil at Tawke 1 in late December 2005, and has now brought a second argument into the debate: that an article of the Iraqi constitution (presumably 137) supposedly establishes legality for all decisions made by the Kurdish regional authorities prior to the adoption of the new constitution in 2005. This too is highly problematic, as the final sentence of article 137 adds “as long as this [i.e. these decisions by the regional authorities] does not contradict the constitution” – thus effectively bringing the debate back to square one. In a press release, DNO also engages in imaginative interpretation of the second part of article 109, attempting to reduce it to a question of “a strategic plan” for “managing pipelines and keeping production within OPEC quotas”. The main problem in this regard is that it is ultimately Iraq’s future constitutional court (the Federal Supreme Court) – not DNO or the Kurdish regional government – which has the authority to interpret the constitution. The composition of this court has not yet been agreed and will be decided by future parliamentary legislation.