Towards a Political Earthquake in Basra?

The political situation in Basra has been tumultuous for some time. But for the first time since January 2005, serious questions have emerged about the internal stability of the governing coalition in Iraq’s most important oil city.

In January 2005, the Fadila party won control of the provincial council in Basra, by establishing an alliance with three other parties and thereby sidelining the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Until now, the junior coalition partners have stood shoulder to shoulder with Fadila during its various challenges – whether from SCIRI, the central government, or, more recently, from Basra supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. The Harakat al-Daawa (a breakaway faction of the Daawa movement) has been particularly supportive of Fadila’s campaign to establish Basra as a small-scale federal region, either on its own, or along with its two neighbouring governorates.

This week, there have been claims that Fadila’s three coalition partners (the secular Wifaq, Harakat al-Daawa and another “independent” Islamist party) have entered into a new “moderate” alliance (Al-Wasat), separate from both Fadila and SCIRI. This coincided with renewed calls by SCIRI for the Fadila governor of Basra to resign. Importantly, today, sources supposedly speaking for the newly formed Wasat have told reporters that they too demand the governor’s resignation.

If confirmed, this could mean the end of Fadila rule in Basra. However, according to Iraqi law (which in this case means CPA order no. 71 on local government), dismissing the governor would require a two-thirds majority, or 28 out of 41 assembly seats. Currently, SCIRI with its coalition partners control around 20 seats, and the newly formed Wasat bloc holds 9 seats – if the bloc exists, that is. In other words, the entire Wasat coalition would have to abandon Fadila if any change were to be brought about.

There is much to suggest that there is not yet any consensus on this: the “sources” from al-Wasat were unnamed, and Fadila sources deny that any move to unseat the governor is underway. In fact, one of the putative Wasat members (the Tajammu‘ ‘Iraq al-Mustaqbal, which holds two seats on the local council) denied having any connection whatsoever with the new “bloc”. SCIRI will probably try to play up the confused situation as much as possible, but until there is a clear two-thirds majority opposed to Fadila, the current governor may well survive in his somewhat precarious position.

Baghdad Zoo: Why “Gated Communities” Will Face Opposition in the Iraqi Capital

More than four years after the start of the Iraq War, the US military’s latest attempt to improve security in Baghdad by way of constructing concrete walls around sectarian enclaves in the Iraqi capital raises serious questions about Washington’s priorities in its Iraq policy.

Perhaps the most important aspect of the latest building boom on the part of the American military is that by no means does this represent an isolated incident. True, the Bush administration deserves some credit for at least nominally holding on to the vision of a unified Iraq in a context where facile partition plans are mushrooming in other circles in the United States. But at the micro level, violations of these lofty ideals of unity are now becoming so frequent that they threaten to render the official policy quite meaningless.

Already during the early days of the war, Washington did not shy away from sometimes using sectarian communities as building blocks. In late March 2003, for instance, General Richard Myers evoked the fact that “half of Baghdad’s population is Shiite” as a key factor that supposedly would facilitate the US occupation of the Iraqi capital. Then came the Bremer administration with its strong conviction that Iraq could be kept stable as long as an ideal formula for sectarian distribution of power could be arrived at. This was followed in 2005 and 2006 by serious attempts on the part of US officials to convince Sunnis to “think in terms of federalism” – all based on the erroneous assumption that this kind of territorial approach enjoyed widespread support in Shiite circles.

Ordinary Iraqis – Sunnis and Shiites alike – have already reacted angrily to the idea of “gated communities”. It is now high time that the wider world understands how these reactions are linked to a more basic ideal of sectarian coexistence and that solutions devised for the Balkans will often tend to be highly irrelevant in Iraq. Iraqis of different sects may be in violent conflict with each other, but they nevertheless detest the territorial expression of sectarian identities, which they traditionally see as belonging to the private domain. Above all, the enshrinement (takris) of sectarian differences in government structures is a long-standing taboo in Iraqi political discourse. In this way, the “gated communities” idea shares a major flaw with the Gelb–Biden plan of dividing Iraq according to sectarian criteria: it is a “solution” which the Iraqis themselves are not seeking. To many Iraqis, “gated communities” will first and foremost mean ugly, permanent scars – even if the idea may well have been conceived with noble intentions of “securing Baghdad neighbourhoods” in a climate of horrific sectarian violence.

When will Westerners realise that most Iraqis – with the exception of many Kurds and a few noisy parliamentarians from other communities – view sectarianism as a perversion and not as a legitimate basis for organising the country politically and administratively? When will US policy-makers understand that the best hope of national reconciliation in Iraq lies not in the search for a magical balance of power between sects (or even partition) but rather in the programmatic dilution of sectarianism? And not least, when will the US military recognise that the forced transformation of Baghdad’s population into sectarian citizens, caged inside tiny, sterile enclaves, could easily turn into an unparalleled propaganda triumph for al-Qaida’s campaign to destroy Iraq’s social fabric?

It is highly disturbing that physical separation schemes of this kind should appear to be a priority of the Bush administration in early 2007, at the expense of the political track towards national reconciliation (which is steadily fading into the background and does not appear to be benefiting from any “surge” windfall). Instead of running against the winds of Iraqi nationalism, Washington should seek to align itself with popular ideas of national unity. A renewed focus on constitutional revision may perhaps seem inopportune to US decision-makers right now, but the angry popular reactions to the “gated communities” idea demonstrate the extent of surviving nationalist sentiment among the Iraqi masses – sentiment that could be built on to crack the most divisive pet projects of Iraqi parliamentarians, and to create the basis of national reconciliation along truly centrist lines.

See also Other People’s Maps

Mysterious Southern Regionalists Cause a Stir in Baghdad

A conference held in Baghdad on 14 April by members of the Council for the Region of the South (Majlis Iqlim al-Janub) has attracted some interest in the pan-Arab press. The council works for the establishment of a southern region limited to Basra, Maysan and Dhi Qar that would create a wedge internally among the Shiites by concentrating all the oil wealth in a single region and leaving six Shiite governorates without any oil.

The pan-Arab press has focused on negative reactions to the project among Iraqi parliamentarians, as could perhaps be predicted. Historically, even Shiite politicians from Baghdad and Najaf have been uneasy about the zest for autonomy among the population of the far south. Thus it is unsurprising that Ali al-Adib of the Daawa party should criticise the movement and its timing, although the manner in which he did so is quite remarkable: he said that such conferences should not come about without prior agreement with governmental and parliamentarian forces. That sort of comment is of course antithetical to the “federalism from below” spirit of the Iraqi constitution (where regions are to be created by popular initiatives rather than by national politicians), but is perhaps another sign that parliamentarians are ambivalent about the powers they theoretically have ceded in this manner – the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) has so far been prominent in trying to impose a federal vision “from above”, namely, that of all the nine Shiite-majority regions south of Baghdad. Negative reactions from Sunni Islamists (who refer to the ongoing process of revising the Iraqi constitution) and “Sadrists” (who on this occasion continue to construe federalism as a plot to partition Iraq) are more in line with expectations, although it is noteworthy that the “Sadrist” press comment was delivered by a Fadila MP from Basra – which could be indicative of the ongoing tension between centralist and regionalist wings inside the Fadila, or a case of a defection from Fadila to the supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. (The media tend to use the term “Sadrists” for the latter only. Conflict between the two groups have surged in Basra lately.)

The goals of the southern regionalists are well known. They have been pursued for more than two years, primarily by the Fadila party, but also by some secularists in Basra and by tribal leaders in Maysan and Dhi Qar (for background, see for instance http://historiae.org/oil.asp ) The interesting aspect about this story is the identity of the regionalists in question. No names are given in the most recent press report, but an organisation with an identical name was founded in Nasiriyya in May last year – so far without attracting much attention from outsiders. Intriguingly, the leading figures behind that move were from SCIRI, Daawa and various smaller political groups in Nasiriyya. The Sadrists and Fadila were not represented. Of course, the central leadership of SCIRI favours a project which competes with the Region of the South (three governorates) – the far bigger Region of the Centre and the South (nine governorates), and as such the SCIRI-led organisation in favour of a small-scale south at first comes across as an astonishing contradiction.

There are at least two possible explanations. Firstly, regional sentiment in the far south of Iraq is very pronounced and often overrides the ideology of the central leadership of the national parties. This has been seen in Fadila (which has always been more localist in Basra), Daawa, among the Sadrists of Maysan (who sometimes employ regionalist rhetoric in the context of oil), and even among SCIRI members in Basra (some of whom continued to focus on Basra and the far south even after the central leadership had declared a single Shiite region as their goal.) The Nasiriyya-based Council for the Region of the South could be yet another example of regionalist sentiment cutting across ideological affiliations. Alternatively, this may be another instance of a phenomenon seen elsewhere in the south, where SCIRI have created “copycat” organisations in order to gain a foothold in a region where they traditionally have had problems. In Maysan, for instance, there are two Hizbollahs, one tribal and quite secularist, another pro-SCIRI and more Islamist. SCIRI are clearly trying to capitalise on the ongoing tension in the Sadrist camp in Basra between Fadila and followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, and theoretically this latest move by the Council for the Region of the South could have to do with another attempt at breaking down resistance to SCIRI in the far south, by co-opting and diluting it. The fact that the foundation of Majlis Iqlim al-Janub back in 2006 was widely reported in SCIRI and Badr media might suggest that the latter interpretation is the more plausible one.

Unitary State, Federalism or Partition: Poll Data Give Mixed Picture of Iraq South of Baghdad

A recent poll commissioned by the BBC, ABC News, and other leading news organisations has produced a wealth of interesting data on Iraqi public opinion as of early 2007, including views on the ideal state structure for Iraq in the future.

The most important question in the survey with regard to the federalism question reads, “Which of the following structures do you believe Iraq should have in the future?” The respondents were presented with three alternatives: “One unified Iraq with a central government in Baghdad”; “Regional states with their own government and a Baghdad federal government”; “A country divided into separate independent states”.

The survey results have appeared in the media in a variety of aggregated formats. For instance, it has been pointed out that the “Shiite community” is divided on the state structure question, with 41% in favour of a unified state, 40% preferring federation, and 19% opting for partition. This means that the Shiites are in the middle on the issue of federalism, less centralist than the Sunnis (97% of whom favour a unitary state) and less separatist than the Kurds (30% of Kurds demand partition and another 49% insist on a federal state structure).

These “Shiite” attitudes to federalism are remarkable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the largest subgroup among the Shiites – 41% – actually indicated a preference for a reversion to a centralised form of government, instead of the system of the current constitution, where federalism is optional and can be triggered by local initiatives in areas seeking autonomy. A fractionally smaller group voiced support for the constitutional formula, whereas partition clearly remains a minority option among the Shiites. The high proportion of Shiite respondents who apparently want to tighten up the provisions for decentralisation in the constitution represents a striking popular reassertion of the ideal of the unitary state in a context where terms like “decentralisation” are de rigueur among political elites. It also makes for an interesting perspective on the manner in which the constitution was adopted back in 2005 and strongly suggests that there may have been a measure of truth in claims that many Iraqis voted in favour of a document with which they were not fully acquainted. It certainly demonstrates the futility of concepts such as “80% solutions” for Iraq, in which it is assumed that Shiite and Kurdish “Yes” votes for the constitution reflect perfect intra-community political consensus among these two groups.

Secondly, it should be stressed that the 40% pro-federal group among the Shiites represents a number of competing federal visions for a future Iraq. Crucially, the questionnaire investigated only attitudes to the general principle of federalism, and not to specific federal formulas. In other words, the aggregate “communal” data (this format is used in the published versions of the poll) do not throw light on questions such as whether there should be a single Shiite region, or several non-sectarian regions, or a bi-national federation of Arabs and Kurds. It is however interesting that for Basra, one of the few areas for which it has been possible to obtain disaggregated data (and an oversample at that), centrifugal forces are stronger than among the Shiites as a whole, with 46% in favour of federalism and 23% seeking outright partition. This is consonant with findings of pro-federal attitudes at the elite level in Basra since 2004. It is also noteworthy that ample evidence from local politics in Basra suggests that “pro-federal” attitudes in this area generally translate into preferences for a small-scale non-sectarian federal unit of Basra only, or of Basra with its two neighbouring governorates. The fact that federalists in Basra are still struggling to get Sunnis and Christians aboard their project also suggests that the Basra Shiite pro-federal segment (as distinct from that of Basra as a geographical area, which also includes non-Shiites) is even bigger than 46%.

The most astonishing disaggregated result is that of Sadr City. Long associated with the Iraqi nationalist Muqtada al-Sadr (whose partisans voted against the October 2006 federalism bill and have cautioned against any implementation of federalism as long as US forces remain in the country), one would have expected this area to contribute to the centralist camp among the Shiites, even if Muqtada’s influence in this vast area may well be exaggerated. However, quite the opposite situation seems to prevail. Pro-federal attitudes are actually more widespread here than in Basra (54%), but even more shocking is the preference voiced for some kind of partition solution – reportedly at 46%.

Evaluating these Sadr City results involves a number of problems. In the first place, there has been some suggestion that security concerns in areas like Sadr City are such that any polling activity in that area is fraught with fundamental difficulties of reliability. The 0% score for “a unified Iraq” is in itself somewhat suspect. But absent any specific indications of foul play, one must assume that the data are reliable, and that 48 adult inhabitants of Sadr City did indeed voice their preference for a divided Iraq. (D3 Systems, who carried out the poll, report a quite rigorous system of supervisor verification of interviews and have specifically commented that this was enforced with regard to Sadr City as well.) What kind of divided Iraq must remain a matter of conjecture though, because Sadr City, unlike Basra, does not have any long-standing pro-federal (let alone separatist) tradition at the elite level. It seems somewhat unlikely, if not completely inconceivable, that the new trend should represent a perfect convergence of opinion between Sadrists and their arch-enemies in the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), who – like US presidential hopeful Joseph Biden – wish to see all Shiites unified in a single territorial entity. Could “partition” simply mean a farewell to what is seen as troublesome Kurds, with Iraq retaining Kirkuk under central government control – as has been a traditional Sadrist demand? Might it involve a league of Sadrist republics, perhaps inspired by the ideas of Salam al-Maliki, the Basra supporter of Muqtada al-Sadr who back in August 2004 presented the only Sadrist separatist threat on record so far? Are the inhabitants of Sadr City – a majority of whom hail from the far south around Amara and for decades have been denigrated by fellow Baghdadi Shiites for their southern origins – voicing solidarity with local efforts in the south to wrestle control of the oil sources from the central government, in order to preserve them for Shiites who consider themselves discriminated against by other, “northern” Shiites?

For the time being, this cannot be answered satisfactorily. The Sadr City numbers are however peculiar and exceptional enough to suggest that there could be a third distinctive pro-federal or even partitionist trend among the Shiites – driven from below rather than from above – and that this in turn, alongside the small-scale federalism of Basra and the far south, has contributed strongly to the pro-federal segment of Shiites in the poll as a whole. All of this should give pause to those who wish to construe pro-federal rhetoric among the Shiites as a unified call for a single Shiite region. Instead, the existence within the pro-federal “Shiite” segment of at least three distinctive currents in favour of federalism and partition means that the scheme for a single Shiite region may be trailing even in its core constituencies (places like Najaf, Hilla and Diwaniyya) and probably scores below the “Shiite” pro-federal averages – which were augmented primarily by separate pro-federal currents in Basra and Sadr City, and probably also by a certain number of respondents in favour of an Arab–Kurdish federation. Ironically, however, several commentators (including USA Today journalists) went on to construe the aggregate poll results as evidence of growing support for a tripartite federal solution.

These findings should trigger alarm bells. There is a certain development over time from earlier polls (support for the unitary state among Iraqis as a whole is down from around 80% in 2004 and 70% in 2005 to 58% now), and Shiites probably account for the majority of defectors from the centralist camp. That even inhabitants of what has long been seen as a nationalist bastion of Sadr City are considering partition could be a warning that the combined weight of sectarian killings and economic underdevelopment is beginning to translate into unorthodox political demands. Once more, the question of whether the current Iraqi system of government has the capacity to handle yet further challenges of decentralisation has become acutely relevant.

However, from the point of view of political stability, it might be useful to look at the poll findings from the opposite end of the spectrum. The largest group among the Shiites still favours a return to a unitary system of government. The Shiite federalist camp is divided into a number of subgroups and thus represents different (and probably negotiable) positions rather than a hardened, unified front. And the assumed leaders of one of these subgroups – Muqtada al-Sadr and, to a lesser extent, Muhammad al-Yaqubi for Sadr City – remain nominally Iraqi nationalist. Accordingly, if these poll data adequately reflect Iraqi public opinion, it should in theory still be possible to engineer a constitutional compromise that could bring a larger number of Iraqis back into the political process. Elements worthy of consideration for this kind of package include a moratorium on federalism south of Kurdistan (ten years to give the central government a chance to perform under more normal circumstances?), a size limit on federal entities (1 to 3 governorates?) and “softer” methods for addressing the concerns of the oil-rich governorates in the far south who do not trust a Shiite-dominated government headed by Baghdadis (for instance by way of a UN-led commission to help equalise patterns of underdevelopment that emerged under the previous regime). A bilateral US–Iraqi deal with a timetable for withdrawal in exchange for a revised constitution could also bring the Sadrists back into the process. In light of the findings in this poll, engagement with the Sadrists (who are grossly underrepresented on the constitutional revision committee) seems particularly important right now, before their radicalism turns even more anarchic.

Unfortunately, however, the process of revising the Iraqi constitution has seen scant progress lately. Instead, the dominant trend seems to be towards “piecemeal” reconciliation, where a troublesome oil bill has been accorded top priority, and where the new zest for regional conferences – however laudable this may be in itself – could threaten to become a diversion that might reduce the Iraqi national reconciliation efforts to a procession of ineffectual tea parties. Those who advocate regionalisation as the main track for Iraq have yet to explain why the elites behind the 2005 constitution – the two Kurdish parties as well as SCIRI, one of the Shiite parties – should suddenly wish to abandon their maximalist claims just because a few neighbouring states begin sending representatives to regional symposia. The hard reality is that some kind of creative and constructive process involving the resources of the US military presence as a negotiating chip may still be the only way to rouse the most obstinate of Iraq’s leaders and induce them to act in a truly national fashion.

This analysis is based on disaggregated data from the BBC & ABC News poll of early 2007. The aggregated data are publicly available here, along with a note on methodology.